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IN FISHER V. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS DERRICK BELL’S 
INTEREST CONVERGENCE THEORY IS ON A COLLISION COURSE 
WITH THE VIEWPOINT DIVERSITY RATIONALE IN HIGHER 
EDUCATION 
 
L. Darnell Weeden ⃰ 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Professor Derrick Bell is necessarily and properly acknowledged because 
of his leading community service as a civil rights lawyer, a scholarly 
intellectual, law professor, and political activist.1  Professor Derrick Bell 
helped to set in place the basis for Critical Race Theory.2 After Professor Bell 
became a member of the faculty of Harvard Law School in 1969, he shared 
his experience and reflections regarding the civil rights movement and issues 
of racial inequality with the academic community in a very profound and 
prolific manner.3   “Because of his views about the permanence of racism and 
the intransigence of inequality generally, Professor Bell and critical race 
theorists have mistakenly been considered to be pessimists.”4 While 
establishing an outstanding legal legacy, “Professor Bell worked to connect 
law, scholarship, and the struggle for social justice, an endeavor that critical 
race theorists also adopted and continue to further today.”5 One commentator 
has described the late Professor Derrick Bell as the “founder of the Critical 
Race Theory movement.”6 Over the course of my career, I have met and 
talked with Professor Bell more than once, and I will describe him as an 
intellectual giant committed to both racial equality and social justice. 
Although I have great respect for Professor Bell as a courageous man of 
principle, I nevertheless believe Professor Bell’s interest convergence theory 
in the context of diversity in higher education merits reconsideration by 
others. 
 
                                                
⃰ Professor, Thurgood Marshall School Of Law, Texas Southern University; B.A., J.D., 
University of Mississippi. I extend a special word of thanks to my wife and children for 
their endurance while  I completed this article. 
1See Derrick Bell Official Site, http://professorderrickbell.com/ (last visited February 
9, 2015). 
2 Id.  
3 See Derrick Bell Official Site, http://professorderrickbell.com/scholarship/ (last 
visited February 9, 2015).  
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Elvia R. Arriola, It's Not Over: Empowering The Different Voice In Legal Academia, 
29 Berkeley J. Gender L. & Just. 320, 325 (2014). 
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Under the Equal Protection principle, a public university’s admission 
policy which makes race a significant factor in order to advance racial 
diversity for an underrepresented racial minority violates the equal protection 
rights of a nonminority.  This is due to the fundamental right to be free of 
racial discrimination in higher education, and therefore is not limited to 
insular and discrete minorities.7 Two major cases that demonstrate this 
concept are Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger.8 In Gratz, the 
Supreme Court concluded that a University of Michigan undergraduate 
admission policy that mechanically awarded twenty percent of the points 
necessary to virtually assure admission of each underrepresented minority 
applicant based exclusively on the applicant‘s race was an unconstitutional 
violation of the equal protection of the law. Conversely, in Grutter v. 
Bollinger,9 the Supreme Court held that law school student body diversity at 
the University of Michigan is a compelling state interest that justifies the use 
of race as one of many factors in a public university admissions under the 
equal protection of the law concept.   
 Professor Derrick Bell contends that the Supreme Court’s 5-4 
approval of Michigan’s Law School’s diversity admission program in Grutter 
is a major case in point demonstrating how his interest convergence theory 
works.10  The interest convergence theory, promoted by the late Professor 
Derrick A. Bell without giving any deference to context, unrealistically 
contends that the interest of African Americans in seeking racial equality is 
supported only if policy makers determine that the interest of African 
Americans converges with a greater political and economic interest of whites 
in America.11 Simply stated, the white/majority will promote racial advances 
for a racial minority only when it also promotes perceived white self-interest.  
Under Professor Bell’s narrow treatment of the interest convergence theory 
racial justice for racial minorities is an incidental by product of white self-
interest.  
This article is divided into three parts. Part I examines Professor Bell’s 
narrow, non-collaborative, treatment of interest convergence.  Part II 
contends that Professor Bell’s interest convergence theory has evolved to a 
collaborative substantial beneficiary move toward freedom for historically 
subordinated racial or ethnic groups.   Part III presents an analysis of the 
Fisher v.  University of Texas12  with its implications for the collaborative 
                                                
7 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
8 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).  
9 Id. 
10 Derrick Bell, Diversity’s Distraction, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1626 (2003). 
11Derrick A. Bell, Jr.,  The Unintended Lessons in Brown v. Board of Education,49 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1053, 1056 (2005). 
12 Fisher v.  University of Texas, 133 S.Ct. 2411 (2013). 
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interest convergence theory and viewpoint diversity as constitutionally 
permissible public policy.  In Fisher13 the Supreme Court refused to 
invalidate the use of race preference in admission at the University of Texas 
at Austin (UT) but remanded the case in order to decide whether the UT 
diversity plan was narrowly tailored to meet the goal of viewpoint diversity.  
Fisher is a direct challenge to the interest convergence theory, that 
historically subordinated racial groups will only receive a substantial 
viewpoint diversity benefit in the admission process at UT if the policy 
primarily promotes white self-interest.   
 
I. THE EXAMINATION OF PROFESSOR BELL’S NARROW, 
NON-COLLABORATIVE TREATMENT OF INTEREST 
CONVERGENCE.  
   
 Professor Bell’s interest convergence theory is highly respected in the 
legal academy and elsewhere.14 Even if it contains words of wisdom, 
Professor Bell’s interest convergence theory should not escape reasonable 
critique.15 Professor Driver, a legal scholar, appropriately asserts that “a 
critical discussion” of Professor Bell’s interest-convergence theory is both 
necessary, proper, and “is long overdue.”16 A potential adverse impact of 
Professor Bell’s interest convergence theory, if left unchallenged, is that it 
may unnecessarily “strengthens the racially conspiratorial viewpoint that is 
disturbingly prevalent in the black community.”17 If Professor Bell’s view of 
interest convergence represents a racial conspiratorial viewpoint, it runs the 
great risk of alienating the many supporters of diversity in higher education 
of many races. Professor Bell recognized that many in America including 
Justice O’Connor, corporate America, and the nation’s military officials, 
argue that viewpoint diversity is needed today in the global market place to 
help students develop the intellectual skills necessary to engage in an 
assortment of people, cultures, accepted wisdom, and perspectives.18  In spite 
of Professor Bell’s interest convergence theory conceivable pragmatic flaws 
it deserves examination due to its “considerable contribution to legal 
discourse.”19    
 
                                                
13 Id. 
14 Justin Driver, Rethinking the Interest Convergence Thesis, 105 NW. U.L. REV. 149, 
156 (2011). 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 156-57. 
18 Bell, Diversity’s Distraction, supra note 10 at 1623 (Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 
2325, 2340 (2003). 
19Driver, Rethinking the Interest Convergence Thesis, supra note 14 at 157.  
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II. PROFESSOR   BELL’S INTEREST CONVERGENCE 
THEORY HAS EVOLVED TO A COLLABORATIVE 
SUBSTANTIAL BENEFICIARY MOVE TOWARD 
FREEDOM FOR HISTORICALLY SUBORDINATED 
RACIAL OR ETHNIC GROUPS.  
 
A collaborative application of Professor Bell’s interest convergence 
theory supports the belief of equality, justice, and fair opportunity with 
everyone sitting down at the table of brotherhood as racial equals. The 
collaborative beneficiaries approach to viewpoint diversity permits an 
inference that collaborative interest convergence is a necessary and proper 
step for America to evolve into a more just and racially equal society.  Since 
the twin goals of social justice and racial equality promote the general welfare 
of all people living in America, collaborative interest convergence is good 
public policy. Professor Bell’s argument that interest convergence in the 
context of race and the law in America is always a one sided venture on 
balance is probably not valid from either a historical perspective or a 
contemporary perspective because racial justice in America as a general rule 
involves a collaboration of interests.  
The Emancipation Proclamation20, well known for advancing freedom for 
many black slaves, is a historic example of the interest convergence theory 
necessarily and properly serving a compelling interest of blacks to be free 
while advancing a substantial interest of whites in abolishing slavery.  Now, 
“the Proclamation is best understood as a legal document, albeit one 
promulgated under unusual circumstances. Lincoln wrote the Emancipation 
Proclamation believing, or fearing, that it might be litigated or challenged in 
the Supreme Court.”21  When the Civil War began in the summer of 1862, 
thousands of slaves abandoned “southern plantations to Union lines, and the 
federal government didn’t have a clear policy on how to deal with them.  
Emancipation would undermine the Confederacy while providing the Union 
with a way to enlist thousands of former slaves.” 22  An expansive reading of 
Bell’s interest convergence theory, as a tool of collaboration, supports my 
conclusion that both the U.S. military and the newly emancipated slaves were 
substantial beneficiaries of an emancipation proclamation that may have been 
inspired by military strategy.23  It would deny social justice and military 
                                                
20Paul Finkelman, Lincoln, Emancipation, And The Limits Of Constitutional Change, 
2008 SUP. CT. REV. 349 (2008) (citing Proclamation No 17, 12 STAT 1268 (Jan 1, 1863)). 
21 Id. 
22 Sarah Pruitt, Five Things You May Not Know About Lincoln, Slavery, and 
Emancipation, HISTORY IN THE HEADLINES (Sept. 21, 2012), 
http://www.history.com/news/5-things-you-may-not-know-about-lincoln-slavery-and-
emancipation.  
23 Id. 
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reality to suggest that newly freed black slaves were only incidental 
beneficiaries of the Emancipation Proclamation even if it was adopted 
predominately for military reasons.   
The historical importance of the Emancipation Proclamation suggests 
that Professor Bell’s interest convergence theory as a general rule should be 
viewed under a primary effects test. This is seen when Bell applies his interest 
convergence theory very narrowly to justify his position that Brown v. Board 
of Education24 only held that racially separate public schools were 
unconstitutional because the primary beneficiaries were whites.25  A 
challenge to racially segregated public school was not a revolutionary idea 
because people rejected segregation in the public schools since the 1840’s26 
without success.27  It was during the 1840’s that the Supreme Court of 
Massachusetts held that it was permissible under state law for the city of 
Boston to establish separate but equal public schools for African American 
schoolchildren. Even if the exclusive motive of the Supreme Court and the 
federal executive branch in Brown in seeking to end public school 
segregation was to achieve a strategic military or propaganda victory in the 
Cold War was intended to benefit whites only, Bell’s narrow interest 
convergence theory does not apply here because African Americans were 
more than mere incidental beneficiary of the end of state sponsored racial 
segregation. Even when interest convergence is intended to benefit the white 
majority it is not to be regarded as an inherently negative situation if the 
primary effect of a focus on the white middle class public policy actually 
substantially advances the anti-subordination goal of African American in 
ending legally required racial segregation in public schools and elsewhere.   
It is conceded in the Brown decision that prohibiting racial segregation may 
have granted to the United States a symbolic victory in the Cold War with 
communist nations.28  However, the practical effect of the Brown anti-
segregation policy served as a collaborative foundation for ending state 
imposed racial segregation in public places. 29   
Professor Bell’s interest convergence theory is not limited to the issue of 
race and the law. Under Professor Bell’s characterization of the role of 
interest convergence, it could be argued that interest convergence is 
nominally implicated whenever the primary purpose of any governmental 
policy is to advance the agenda of the white middle class. Interest 
                                                
24 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
25 Derrick A. Bell, Jr.,  The Unintended Lessons in Brown v. Board of Education,49 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1053, 1056 (2005). 
26 Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass 198 (Mass. 1849). 
27 Bell, supra note 26. 
28 Id. at 1056. 
29 Id. 
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convergence motivated by a focus on what is good for the white middle class, 
which has the actual effect of substantially advancing social justice and racial 
equality historically sought by subordinated groups, and their collaborators 
should be embraced and not considered as inherently evil.  Some scholars 
believe that the narrow self-interest convergence theory is implicated in series 
of issues including animal rights and the war on terror.30  Scholars have 
utilized the narrow self-interest interest convergence theory to help explain 
why the separation of church and state concept typically provides only 
minimal benefits to groups underrepresented in the political process.31  Often 
under represented, religious groups benefit only when their interest happened 
to converge or correspond with the interest of an influential religious group.32   
Under the narrow view of the interest convergence theory, the primary benefit 
of separation of church and state accrues to Christianity as a recognized 
leading religion in America.33. 
Furthermore, with respect to workplace diversity, the narrow self-interest 
convergence view holds that the government will require employers to hire 
nonwhites only when doing so converges with the institutional interests of 
the employer.34   It is alleged that when hiring, racial diversity is pursued 
when the employer seeks institutional legitimacy while accommodating the 
preferences of a historically racially homogeneous workplace environment.35 
In some instances an employer may reasonably conclude that a racially 
homogenous American work force may make it less profitable in the global 
or local market place. An employer may also allege that work force diversity 
serves a compelling interest because it has no other effective way to remain 
competitive in a global marketplace. By analogy supporters of educational 
diversity in the field of higher education may reasonably contend that 
academic freedom supports intellectual diversity as a compelling interest.  
Under the rationale of Grutter v. Bollinger,36 intellectual diversity is narrowly 
tailored because it is a very effective way to teach students as future leaders 
in business and government, as well as employees and employers, how to 
compete in an international market place of ideas while minimizing domestic 
unrest and international armed conflict. 
Professor Bell’s narrow scope of the interest convergence theory is 
extremely controversial in the context of advancing diversity in higher 
                                                
30 Justin Driver, Rethinking the Interest Convergence Thesis, supra note 18 at 155.  
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 See Stephan M. Feldman, Principle, History, and Power:  The Limits of the First 
Amendment Religion Clauses, 81 IOWA L. REV. 833, 871–72 (1996). 
34 See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race 
Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1764 (2003). 
35 Id.   
36 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
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education because of the nature of the benefit sought. Since the benefit of 
racial diversity in higher education is recognized constitutionally as a 
compelling shared goal of blacks, other racial minorities, and whites; 
Professor Bell’s narrow view of interest convergence is so problematic that 
it invites discussion. When important shared goals of whites and other racial 
minorities including blacks converge in the fight for the benefits of 
intellectual diversity in higher education, a more expansive collaborative 
view of interest convergence is required than the one articulated by Professor 
Bell.  
Under a collaborative view of the interest convergence theory, it is 
important to discuss whether a convergence of interest between historically 
subordinate racial minorities and the white power structure actually has the 
effect of advancing a compelling or important educational diversity goal 
sought by blacks and other racial minorities. Since blacks and other 
traditionally underrepresented minorities groups have aggressively sought to 
protect the alleged benefit of viewpoint diversity in higher education, it would 
lack congruence to conclude to that the awarding of diversity in higher 
education is experienced by blacks as only an incidental benefit.  A 
predominantly white university developing or asserting a true interest in 
intellectual diversity as a tool of academic freedom provides a welcomed 
opportunity to discuss issues related to law and equality. Intellectual 
diversity, even if inspired primarily by an academic freedom movement 
which collaboratively converges with a longstanding black goal of achieving 
racial diversity in higher education, does not render the black racial diversity 
goal as an inherently inferior and incidental factor. 
The diversity rationale for affirmative action is unnecessarily 
creatively complex because it allegedly does not compensate beneficiaries 
for past racial discrimination experienced in society.37 Nevertheless, William 
G. Bowen and Derek Bok in The Shape of the River conclusion regarding the 
benefits generated by expanding diversity in American colleges and 
universities, has a practical individual compensatory effect for a beneficiary 
of affirmative action where race is a factor in the admission process.38 
Diversity black male graduates careers are greatly enhanced because race 
conscious inspired affirmative action provided them with an opportunity to 
graduate from prestigious colleges and universities. This will allow them to 
generally earn double the amount of money earned by black males with 
Bachelor of Arts degrees from less prestigious colleges during a similar 
                                                
37 Tung Yin, Is “Diversity” Diverse Enough? 21 ASIAN AM. L.J. 89, 93 (2014). 
38 Id. At 94 (Citing William G. Bowen & Derek Bok, The Shape Of The River: Long-
Term Consequences Of Considering Race In College And University Admissions 281-82 
(1998). 
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twenty year period.39 Secondly, Bowen and Bok contend the race conscious 
affirmative action which enhanced the career results for these black male 
graduates also benefitted society because diversity graduates from 
prestigious colleges are more likely than their similarly situated white peers 
to assume leadership roles in civic and community groups.40 Some supporters 
of intellectual diversity with a race factor think communities of color will 
benefit since the ethnic or racial minority diversity affirmative action 
graduates is more likely than others to serve communities of color as doctors, 
lawyers, and as professionals in the global market place.41 Finally, Bowen 
and Bok conclude that a racial diverse student body at the college level 
benefits non-minority students, because race matters and white students need 
at a minimum academic classroom realization of the attitudes, views, and 
circumstances confronting most racial minorities.42  
 Professor Bell’s white self-interest diversity theory is very 
problematic for Twenty First Century universities seeking to promote either 
viewpoint or racial diversity. From a historical perspective it has been 
assumed by one commentator that the “Interest- Convergence principally 
contemplates what will be, rather than what has been.”43  Professor Bell’s 
racial justice Prophet Dr. W.E.B. Du Bois was too pragmatic to reject 
diversity because it might have been motivated primarily by white self-
interest if the goal of achieving racial equality for blacks was actually 
advanced.44  In the field of higher education it is very plausible that Dr. Du 
Bois would accept a viewpoint diversity plan that created a more diverse 
collaborative education for all college students.45  
Since Dr. Du Bois was a pragmatic intellectual he would support a 
college diversity plan that provided students of color with a wider networking 
opportunity in their future.46 One of the benefits of viewpoint diversity for all 
college students is that it may stimulate mutual respect for all races while 
serving as a deterrence to future acts of racism. A progressive collaborative 
view of the interest convergence in the context of higher education and 
                                                
39 Id. 
40 Id.  at 94-95 (citing BOWEN & BOK, supra note 38, at 258). 
41 Id.  at  95 (citing See, e.g., Terrance Sandalow, Minority Preferences in Law School 
Admissions, in Constitutional Government In America 277, 282–83 (1980)). 
42 Id. (citing Terrance Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political 
Responsibility and the Judicial Role, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 686 (1975)). 
43Driver, Rethinking the Interest Convergence Thesis, supra note 14 at 149.  
44Derrick Bell, Racism As The Ultimate Deception, 86 N.C.L.REV. 621, 629 (2007–
2008). 
45 See id. (citing W.E. Burghardt Du Bois, Does the Negro Need Separate Schools? 4 
J. NEGRO EDUC. 328, 335 (1935)). 
46 See id. 
2016] UTAH LAW REVIEW ONLAW 109 
diversity may recognize the color-line as a continuing major problem47 but 
offer viewpoint diversity as a tool to help promote racial and cross cultural 
understanding to address issues of racial and economic inequality. One of the 
major functions of viewpoint diversity under the rationale of Grutter v. 
Bollinger 48 is to advance a multicultural understanding in an increasingly 
diverse workforce and society. Supporter of diversity in higher education 
may agree with the declaration made by the singer Ray Charles that 
“understanding is the best thing in the world.”49  
Since the battle to achieve viewpoint diversity in higher education 
represents shared goals in the political process promoted by white, blacks, 
and other racial minorities in achieving racial justice, it is unfair to treat 
interest convergence as an exclusive tool of white self-interest.50 Professor 
Bell plausibly suggests that once interest convergence moves beyond the 
judicial process, interest convergence has the potential to develop into a 
valuable collaborative blueprint.51 Professor Bell suggests that defenders of 
the University of Michigan’s diversity plan implemented the interest 
convergence theory to serve the University’s white self-interest perhaps at 
the request and expense of its black supporters.52  While connecting the 
University of Michigan Law School diversity approach to his interest 
convergence theory Professor Bell said, “Using the interest convergence 
model in planning and implementing civil rights strategies may mean relying 
less on courts to advance racial goals. But, as individuals and groups, we have 
to challenge the assumptions of white dominance and the presumption of 
black incompetence.”53  A collaborative approach to interest convergence 
based on racial equality and respect for the individual inherently rejects the 
assumption of white superiority.  
The irony of Professor Bell’s traditional interest convergence theory 
in the higher education diversity battle is that it is hard to support the white 
self-interest theory as the exclusive justification for viewpoint diversity when 
the diversity program has the potential of denying a white applicant’s 
admission to either the highly respected university of Michigan Law School 
or the greatly regarded University of Texas undergraduate school. I believe it 
is appropriate to contend that UT is dedicated to keeping its diversity goals 
alive because it reasonably believes that the best interest of all members of 
                                                
47 Id. (citing W.E. BURGHARDT DUBOIS, The Souls of Black Folk 23 (1903)). 
48 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
49 Bell, Racism as the Ultimate Deception, supra note 44 (citing Ray Charles, 
Understanding, on PORTRAIT OF RAY (ABC Records 1968)). 
50 Contra, Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Unintended Lessons In Brown v. Board of 
Education, N.YL. Sch. L. Rev. 1053, 1066, (2004–2005).  
51 Id. 
52 Id.  
53 Id. 
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society is best served by the benefits of viewpoint diversity. 
 
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF FISHER V. UNIVERSITY OF 
TEXAS FOR THE COLLABORATIVE INTEREST 
CONVERGENCE THEORY AND THE VIEWPOINT 
DIVERSITY DEBATE 
 
UT takes into account race as one of a number of elements in its 
undergraduate admissions practice.54 Race is not given a mathematical 
assessment for every single candidate, nevertheless the University has 
devoted resources to expanding racial minority registration on campus. UT 
identifies its objective as achieving a critical mass of minority students. In 
Fisher v. University of Texas, a Caucasian plaintiff, sued the University after 
her submission was denied. She claims that the University's treatment of race 
in its admission practice is prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The parties requested the Court to decide whether 
the judgment of the lower courts below properly applied the Supreme Court's 
decisions construing the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment under the rationale of Grutter v. Bollinger.55 The Court held that 
because the Court of Appeals fail to hold the University to the demanding 
burden of strict scrutiny established in Grutter, its ruling affirming the 
District Court's award of summary judgment to the University was improper. 
That verdict was vacated, and the case was remanded for additional 
proceedings.56 
After the Court's decisions in Grutter v. Bollinger, and Gratz v. 
Bollinger, UT implemented, the 2004 program in which the University 
utilized an explicit consideration of race. The 2004 program was challenged 
in Fisher.57 In Grutter, the Court approved the use of race as one of many 
“plus factors” in the admissions process that measured the complete 
individual impact of each candidate.58 In Gratz, by comparison, the Court 
concluded Michigan's undergraduate registration process was an 
unconstitutional admissions program, because it mechanically gave points to 
candidates from specific racial groups.59 UT’s plan to implement race-
conscious admissions was announced in a June 2004 document called 
Proposal to Consider Race and Ethnicity in Admissions (Proposal).60 The 
                                                
54 Fisher v. University of Texas, 133 S.Ct. 2411, 2415 (2013). 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 2416. 
58 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
59 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 204 (2003). 
60  Fisher v. University of Texas, 133 S.Ct. 2416 (2013).   
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Proposal determined that the University did not have a “critical mass” of 
minority students, and that in order to cure the shortage it was essential to use 
race as an explicit factor in the undergraduate admissions process. To execute 
the Proposal UT included a student's race as a factor in the (Personal 
Achivement Index) PAI score, starting with candidates in the fall of 2004. 
The University requests students to categorize themselves from among five 
predefined racial groups on the application.61  While race is not assigned a 
direct numerical value it is acknowledged that race is a significant or 
important factor in the admission process.62 
A racial classification by a public university must meet a strict 
scrutiny standard because decisions considering race must be narrowly 
tailored to accomplish a compelling governmental interest.63 A compelling 
interest that might justify a utilization of race is the educational advantages 
that are naturally generated by a diverse student body.64 Remedying historical 
discrimination is not a compelling interest, since it is incompatible with a 
university's expansive undertaking in the enterprise of education.65  Unlike a 
university, the Supreme Court contends, the judicial, legislative, or 
administrative governmental entities have the necessary expertise and 
resources to determine whether racial classification is needed to remedy past 
societal discrimination.66 
 A diverse student body is intended to promote independent 
viewpoints in spite of a race conscious admission procedure.67  It is 
reasonable to foresee that a university’s viewpoint diversity goals will 
promote inclusive classroom dialogue when a critical mass of students with 
nontraditional backgrounds do not experience unreasonable racial or social 
isolation.68 A primary effect of expanding a university’s goal in developing 
diversity is the lessening of social economic status isolation and other status 
stereotypes.69 The educational operation of a university is granted an 
important degree of deference under the First Amendment. Because a 
university is a creative intellectual enterprise its determination about ‘who 
may be admitted to study” should be given a great deal of deference.70 Justice 
Powell's characterization of the benefits of university level diversity as a 
                                                
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. At 2417. 
64 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 305, 307-309 (1978)  
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Fisher v. University of Texas, 133 S.Ct. at 2418 (2013).   
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. (citing Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring in judgment). 
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complex permissible goal is very accurate.  According to Justice Powell 
viewpoint diversity is not limited to unsophisticated attempts at racial 
diversity, in which a quantified percentage of the student body is promised to 
designated racial groups.71 A diversity goal which promotes a compelling 
state interest involves a more extensive grouping of experiences than racial 
or ethnic origin.72  
The recent educational diversity opinion in Fisher v. University of 
Texas requires universities to articulate a compelling rationale to justify their 
viewpoint diversity goals.73 For example, a university as an academic 
institution could contend that the benefits of viewpoint diversity are 
compelling because like free speech intellectual diversity serves the societal 
value of promoting the search for knowledge and truth in the market place of 
ideas while promoting individual fulfilment on issues of race and social 
justice.74 When free speech and intellectual diversity goals are treated as 
compelling academic endeavors enhanced by First Amendment free speech 
and freedom of association considerations a university’s diversity procedure 
is less likely to remind a court of a racial quota.  
According to certain commentators, Fisher is very noteworthy 
because of what it did not do rather than for what it actually did.75 The Court 
refused to invalidate UT's holistic admissions program, and rejected the  
temptation to overrule Grutter and it did not officially, modify the 
constitutional benchmarks declared in Grutter, did not rule that UT's 
admissions procedure  flunked the narrowly tailoring test, took no steps 
indicate shortcomings in the UT diversity plan.76 One popular interpretation 
of Fisher by the supporters of diversity, is that it did not create any new law, 
but was a simply black letter restatement of Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz v. 
Bollinger. “Upon a closer reading, Fisher is a departure from settled law in a 
number of critical respects.”77  The Supreme Court's decision in Fisher 
pretends that it is simply instructing the Fifth Circuit that its utilization of the 
law invented in Grutter was wrong.78 In spite of this assertion, the Court's 
unforeseen judgment abandons the standard approved in Grutter while 
inventing a different legal standard.79 Some scholars contend the greatest 
                                                
71 Id. 
72 Id. (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315 separate opinion).       
73Tung Yin, Is “Diversity” Diverse Enough? supra note 37 at 38.  
74 See Emerson, The System Freedom of Expression (1970). 
75 John A. Powell, Stephen Menendian, Fisher V. Texas: The Limits of Exhaustion And 
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problem with Fisher is that the Court's strong suggestion that a public 
university must run through all practical race-neutral options in order to 
justify the educational diversity benefit under the narrowly tailoring strict 
scrutiny test articulated in Grutter.80  Justice Kennedy's statement in Fisher 
that all practical race-neutral options be given serious deliberation in order to 
meet the strict scrutiny test invented in Grutter, symbolizes a problematic 
retreat from Grutter.81 Fisher looks as if it has substituted Grutter's demand 
of a good faith deliberation of race-neutral opportunities with the additional 
demand that all practical race neutral options be given serious 
consideration.82 It is alleged that the Fisher opinion places Grutter’s 
educational benefits of diversity rationale at risk because “the Court shifts 
responsibility for assessing the viability of workable race-neutral alternatives 
from the university to the courts.”83 In Grutter, when the University of 
Michigan alleged that it was using race as a single factor among many other 
factors to promote the educational benefits of diversity, the Court allowed the 
university to survive the narrow tailoring test.   The Court presumed the 
university was acting in “good faith” in evaluating the lack of practical race 
neutral options to achieve its academic mission.84   
On remand in Fisher v. University of Texas85 the Fifth Circuit 
acknowledged that the Supreme Court’s decision in Grutter mandates the 
application of strict scrutiny as to UT’s diversity admissions procedure 
because it utilized race as a factor.  After discussing Justice Kennedy's dissent 
in Grutter, the Supreme Court disapproved  of both the federal district court's 
and the Fifth  Circuit’s judicial approval of  the race conscious procedure 
utilized by UT Austin to promote diversity because UT  procedures did not 
meet the narrowly tailored requirements needed  to seek a diverse student 
body. The Fifth Circuit’s charge on remand was to give exacting scrutiny to 
UT’s diversity endeavors.86 On remand the Fifth Circuit took a less 
deferential approach to UT’s diversity goals by applying a form of strict 
scrutiny that Professor Vinay Harpalani has described as a “unique 
contribution to diversity” requirement.87  According to Professor Harpalani, 
the goal of the unique contribution to diversity requirement allows the court 
to reasonably “assess the underlying issue raised by Fisher-whether a race 
conscious policy is necessary to attain the educational benefits of diversity 
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when a race-neutral policy is in place and has increased diversity.” 88 The 
choice to chase the educational benefits created by student body diversity that 
a University considers important to its undertaking is, for all practical purpose 
an academic judgment to which a degree of academic freedom deference 
from the judicial branch is appropriate under Grutter.89  Without trying to 
decide whether a critical mass exists at UT the unique contribution to 
diversity analysis converges on whether UT’s race-conscious admission 
policy reasonably adds distinctively to the educational benefits of viewpoint 
diversity expressed in Grutter.90 
The deference to diversity rationale articulated by the Fifth Circuit on 
remand indicates that Professor Bell interest convergence theory might be a 
little insensitive to the old fashion art of horse trading.91 In my view 
collaborative interest convergence is analogous to horse trading. 
Collaborative interest convergence in the academic policy making framework 
is similar to the legislative setting because both politicians and academicians 
after reasonable opportunity to debate on an issue are comfortable 
compromising to achieve their policy goals.92  The Fifth Circuit on remand 
in Fisher may have allowed diversity to live because of its implicit judicial 
appreciation of collaborative interest convergence as involving the art of 
conciliation.93 It appears that the Fifth implicitly rejected Professor Bell’s 
white self-interest convergence theory because it recognized that the UT 
diversity plan represented a collaborative cooperation even though it was an 
immediate burden to the white self-interest of those applicants who unlike 
Fisher who might have been admitted to UT but for the race conscious 
affirmative action plan.94 Under the rationale of both Grutter and Fisher a 
court is required to confirm that   a rationale principled explanation exists for 
the academic decision to purse the benefits of diversity.95 Fisher notes that, 
“Diversity is a composite of the backgrounds, experiences, achievements, and 
hardships of students to which race only contributes.”96  
In 1997, after the Hopwood v. Texas97 opinion in which the court 
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determined that race could not be used as a factor in law school admissions, 
UT confronted a difficult situation: realizing holistic diversity while 
incorporating racial diversity which it deemed important to its academic 
undertaking but not facially taking into account race as one of several factors 
of diversity. Prohibited from utilizing race as a factor after Hopwood, UT 
implemented the Top Ten Percent Plan, which provides Texas inhabitants 
finishing in the top ten percent of their graduating high school class an option 
to attend any public university in Texas.98 The Top Ten Percent process had 
the ability to cover every freshman seat at UT, however, by itself it was not 
an acceptable method of promoting the holistic diversity anticipated by 
Bakke.99 The Top Ten Percent plan was flawed because it did not include 
superior-performing, multi-talented students, minority or non-minority.100 
Because it focused exclusively on class rank The Top Ten Percent Plan places 
an undue burden on viewpoint diversity and academic integrity because it 
excluded huge numbers of extremely qualified minority and non-minority 
candidates.101 The problem with the Texas Top Texas Top Percent Plan was 
addressed by the Court in Grutter, when it said “even assuming such plans 
are race-neutral, they may preclude the university from conducting the 
individualized assessments necessary to assemble a student body that is not 
just racially diverse, but diverse along all the qualities valued by the 
university.”102  
The Fifth Circuit rejected Fisher’s contention that socioeconomic 
disadvantage is an appropriate race-neutral alternative procedure under a 
holistic review because race still matters even when it should not be relevant 
at all.103  “Bakke accepts that skin color matters—it disadvantages and ought 
not to be relevant but it is. We are ill-equipped to sort out race, class, and 
socioeconomic structures, and Bakke did not undertake to do so.”104 After 
refusing to “conclude that skin color is no longer an index of prejudice” the 
Fifth Circuit upheld the UT diversity plan under the Supreme Court’s Fisher 
strict scrutiny standard of no other practical option 105 rather than Fisher’s 
unacceptable Fifth Circuit’s good faith strict scrutiny light approach.106   
While meeting the demanding, narrow tailoring requirement under 
the equal protection principle UT proved that a race-conscious holistic review 
remained indispensable to the Top Ten Percent plan because it allows UT to 
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support a facially-neutral process while seeking to enrich viewpoint diversity 
as an academic undertaking.107 Grutter reiterated the belief that growing up 
in a specific region, possessing certain professional encounters and the 
unique experience of being a racial minority in an American society where 
race still matters will probably impact a person’s viewpoint.108 The Fifth 
Circuit was convinced on remand that to block UT’s requested narrow use of 
race as a factor as it pursues holistic diversity, would unnecessarily impair 
the richness of the educational involvement permitted under the basic 
principles of Bakke and Grutter.109 
 The diversity skill sets created by admitting candidates from 
majority-white and majority-minority schools supports the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Fisher that evenhanded educational diversity is deeper than skin 
color.110 “To conclude otherwise is to narrow its focus to a tally of skin colors 
produced in defiance of Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court which 
eschewed the narrow metric of numbers and turned the focus upon 
individuals. This powerful charge does not deny the relevance of race.”111  
The Fifth Circuit decided that because race still matters it may be utilized as 
a single narrowly tailored compelling element to assist UT in its task of 
admitting “students with a range of skills, experiences, and performances” 
that promote viewpoint diversity on campus.112 
  Although many believe diversity produces significant benefits for 
students, colleges as well as society, the viewpoint diversity rationale has 
been subjected to major criticism.113 It has been accused of not actually 
developing racial justice for students of color, but rather benefiting white 
colleges by legitimizing admissions policies that support white privilege 
while creating an atmosphere that cause in fighting among minority 
groups.114  Because the Supreme Court in Grutter and Gratz approved 
diversity as a compelling state interest but nevertheless refused to recognize 
the remediation of societal  discrimination as also  compelling Professor 
Derrick Bell said an exclusive concentration on diversity permits courts as 
well as policymakers to evade truths regarding past and continuing racial 
discrimination.115 According to Professor Bell, rather than receive these self-
evident truths as validation for a truly remedial interest in affirmative action 
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that would assist racial minorities, policymakers advertise, and some courts 
support, the viewpoint that diversity is a compelling interest primarily 
because of diversity's advantage for Whites.116  
Professor Bell’s interest convergence attack on the diversity rationale 
is potentially self-destructive because it undermines the collaborative interest 
convergence efforts among blacks and other minority groups since it 
unreasonably presumes that whites are generally not capable of championing 
social and racial justice without being preoccupied with white self-interest. 
An interest convergence theory that places undue emphasis on the need to 
protect white self interest in the viewpoint diversity debate is pragmatically 
unacceptable to groups like African Americans, Mexican Americans, and 
diversity friendly whites. Whites like members of other races may endorse 
diversity, because they simply want to end the lack of viewpoint diversity at 
institutions of higher education. Professor Bell’s interest convergence theory 
promotes an outcome that “is antithetical to genuine social justice 
movements, which should encourage”117 all groups to support one another in 
order to create a better society even if means sacrificing their self- interest. I 
believe that championing a race neutral diversity percentage plan has the 
potential to be accepted under a collaborative interest convergence theory 
because it will inspire larger and more operational viewpoint diversity than a 
diversity plan that is explicitly race conscious.  
When the United States Supreme Court in the Fisher v. University of 
Texas opinion explained the Texas's Top Ten Percent Law as a race-neutral 
process for realizing the viewpoint diversity, it engaged in collaborative 
interest convergence in order to save the diversity goals articulated in its 
Grutter decision.118  Collaborative interest convergence allowed the Supreme 
Court in Fisher to judicially label the Texas Top Ten Percent as 
presumptively valid race-neutral social legislation under the Equal Protection 
Clause rational basis standard. This is due to the Texas plan’s conceivable 
rational relationship with UT’s articulated academic enhancement viewpoint 
diversity goal.119  Unlike a race-conscious percentage plan promoting 
viewpoint diversity a race neutral plan does not have to meet the strict 
scrutiny Equal Protection Clause diversity standard articulated in Grutter.120 
The Supreme Court’s characterization of the Top Ten Percent Plan in 
Fisher as race neutral in spite of Justice Ginsburg’s solo dissenting position 
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that the plan is race conscious signals an implied judicially collaborative 
interest convergence that represents a type of judicial consensus that may not 
be available under a race-conscious percentage plan.121 A majority of the 
Court now appears ready to support a race-neutral Texas percentage plan 
under the rational basis standard which signals a collaborative interest 
convergence and a continuing judicial acknowledgement that viewpoint 
diversity among college students will probably increase the understanding 
our society needs in order to bring a quicker end to racial and social isolation 
that often leads to discrimination.122  Viewpoint diversity shows great 
potential for social healing because in a civil society change “comes from a 
confluence of personal, cultural, and legal transformation,”123 
On June 29, 2015, the United States Supreme Court granted a petition 
for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
in order to rehear the Fisher case.124  The family of Heman Marion Sweatt 
who was not admitted to the University Of Texas Law School because he was 
“a negro” has filed an up-to-date brief endorsing UT Austin's existing 
admission's policies.125 Sweatt's family backs UT in its extended legal 
encounter with Abigail Fisher, who maintains her 2008 denial of admission 
by the state's flagship university was race based discrimination.126 The Fisher 
case will be argued before the Supreme Court for the second time in 
December of 2015 and has far-reaching implications regarding how 
universities in America may treat race in the admissions process.127 “The 
Sweatt family's brief, which is one of many to have been filed ahead of 
December's oral arguments, says that UT considers race the right way: as only 
one factor.”128 However, according to the brief filed with the Supreme Court 
by Fisher's lawyers’, "By holding that UT discriminated against 
Ms. Fisher and reversing the judgment below, the Court will not only 
vindicate her equal-protection rights, it will remind universities that the use 
of race in admissions must be a last resort -- not the rule”129 
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This article has reasoned that Professor Bell’s interest convergence 
theory in the context of viewpoint diversity in higher education is probably 
too restrictive because it implies that judicial transformation in rejecting 
racial discrimination is only inspired by white self-interest.130  If the interest 
conversion theory represents the concept that blacks will only achieve an 
educational diversity viewpoint benefit when it serves exclusively white self-
interest, it is not likely to receive any deference or recognition by the Court 
in Fisher. However, Fisher suggests a race neutral percentage plan designed 
to advance the viewpoint of diversity in Texas colleges, represents a legal and 
cultural transformation that is consistent with the Confucianism concept of 
respect for individual dignity.131 A college viewpoint diversity plan that does 
not discriminate on the basis of race, is a feature of Confucianism has won 
general acceptance in Texas. A race neutral viewpoint of the diversity 
percentage plan, motivated by a collaborative interest convergence for the 
twin purposes of immediate academic enhancement and long term 
community progress, is a characteristic of Confucianism132 which was 
implicitly recognized by the Supreme Court in Fisher.133   
Professor Bell’s interest convergence attack on the diversity rationale 
is potentially self-destructive because it undermines the collaborative interest 
convergence efforts among blacks and minority groups since it unreasonably 
presumes that whites are generally not capable of championing social and 
racial justice without being preoccupied with white self-interest. An interest 
convergence theory that places undue emphasis on the need to protect white 
self interest in the viewpoint diversity debate is pragmatically unacceptable 
to groups such as African Americans, Mexican Americans, and diversity 
friendly whites. Whites like members of other races may endorse diversity, 
because they simply want to end the lack of viewpoint diversity at institutions 
of higher education. Although Professor Bell’s interest convergence theory 
may have intellectual appeal, it may unfairly discredit the goals of those who 
truly believe that a society benefits from intellectual diversity.  
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